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Tuesday, November 29, 2022

November 2022 Portfolio Update

 As of end of trading 29-Nov-2022,

S&P 500 Index Fund: -15.43% -> -13.77%

Hong Kong Tracker Fund: -29.32% -> -17.22% (huge improvement in 1 month)

Straits Times Index Fund: 0.92%  -> 8.24% (such optimism had nearly gone unnoticed)

My portfolio: -21.48% -> -18.17% (not much improvement)

Transactions:

1) Increase in T-Bills purchase for my mum

2) Modest increase in OKP

3) Modest increase in Alibaba (9988).

Commentary:

Portfolio lagged against indices this month, particularly Hong Kong. This is because much of the holdings are in Central China holdings-- which did not receive as much optimistic buy-ins as compared to its bigger, more well-known peers. I believe the boost in prices came from buy-ins from Chinese investors, and Central China positions are taken off stock-connect some time back.

I am more concern with my family life, as my mum suffered a huge episode of high blood sugar, and had to be sent to the hospital. She was warded in high dependency ward and subsequently in a normal ward. I spent the first day largely sleepless, as the hospital called in every couple of hours to report status; a blood test here, an urgent procedure next, and so on.

Now mum is safely back home. But life would never be the same again. Before this, we were much more careless with high glucose readings. Dosage has been raised, but readings remain stubbornly high. Luckily we are visiting the diabetes doctor next week.


Monday, November 21, 2022

CCRE liabilites: A mountain to climb

Daily falls of 8% and more is common with this stock.


Central China Real Estate (CCRE) is one of my sizable investments. It is one of those "high risk, high reward" bets, and probably the riskiest. Here is a note to myself, perhaps as a reminder to never take such bets again.

It is well known that the company balance sheet is in great trouble. Its share price currently reflect a price to book of... 7 cents to 1 dollar of asset.

Looking at their interim report in late Sep 2022, the numbers look equally ugly.

Short Term Debt,
...of bank loans and other loans, 5761.86m
...of senior notes, 5354.493m

Long Term Debt,
...of bank loans 3551.778m
...of senior notes, 10972.022m

=================

Payables,
...51622.988m (!!!!), of which 40B of it does not involve associates or entities controlled by the owner.

==================

Assets
... stated as Inventories, of which are Properties, under development 88075.223m (could this figure be trusted, since property prices are falling?)
... of properties already developed: 6554.351m

Cash: 3622.412m
Restricted bank deposits: 2885.414
Receivables: 5548.762

==================

as of now, the only good news is very publicly known: Henan Tongshenzhiye would be issued 29.01% of the shares float for a convertible bond, yielding 5% at 708m HKD. IMO, this is not a large sum and conditions laid out are not publicly stated.

If we were to trust the asset value, it sums up to a total of 106686m, or 106.7B. 
The liabilities (including the monstrous payables), total up to 77263m or 77.263B.

As such, it is clear that the market believes the property sales will suffer for a long time, and/or the value of the properties (be it developed or still developing) are overstated.

I am cautiously watching for news and believe that short of a miracle, it will be a long, winter-like wait till the company emerges from the weight of its troubles. 

一年一年过。

Tuesday, November 15, 2022

The Resumption of Best World

Best World resumed trading yesterday. Prior to that, it had conducted two "equal access buyback offers," both at arguably very low prices of 1.36$. I wrote an opinion after the first exercise was announced. I do think that the price was opportunistic.

So on Monday, I surmise that the patient and opportunistic bunch would bid up the prices. They did. From the open price of 1.47 (an 8% over the buyback price), to a day high of 1.87 (up 37.5%). The market calmed down and ended at 1.82.

Today, on the second day of trading, saw sell down till 1.57, representing a decline of 13.7%. It was pretty volatile, and ended with a doji candlestick pattern of 1.64. Volume on both days does not differ significantly.

At 1.64$ a share, and 440.121093 million shares (based on the latest announcement of share buy back conducted today), this means Best World is priced as follows, based on the 3Q filings:

Market Capitalization: 721.79m

Cash and Eq: 356.918m

Inventory: 77.352m

Receivables: 20.027m

Total Liabilites: 209.6m

Should we discount the value of inventories and receivables by 50% each, without discounting any for cash and eq, the quick and dirty net asset is of 198.9m, or round off to about 200m.

This means that a shareholder is paying 521.8m dollars in effect for a company that had been earning 54m (in 2017) to 140-ish million (2018, 2020, and 2021). It earned 70m in 2019. Based on any year, none of them look too demanding. 3Q filings does register decline in cash flows on a y-o-y basis.

The biggest contributor to its coffers appear to be still from China. So the worsening numbers could reasonably be attributed to the country's COVID control policies.

If one would had know that trading would resume in a matter of months, no reasonable shareholder would have participated in the equal access offer. None of the executive directors sold-- that would be expected. Those who sold had their money stuck in there for way too long.

What caught my eye is that board members, particularly the non-exec directors, as well as senior management largely remained in the company.

Purchasing Best World shares at the moment is difficult on a couple of counts: first, one would be aware of the possibility that the company would run foul of regulations/laws. Since board membership remains largely the same, I think the probability of it is low.

The second reason is likely price anchoring given how the stock surged on day 1. Maybe it would be easier to look at it from a value point of view; if there is still a huge gap between value and price, a 30% surge on a day might mean little.

So my back of the envelope math tells me:
Since the "net" asset is about 200m, and cash flow is about 100-140m in recent times, a no-growth multiple of 7-8, based on an assumption that it would earn about 90m yearly, means this company is worth about 200m + (630m to 720m) which round off to~ 830m to 920m. These are very "safe" and conservative numbers, indicating a margin of safety of only 15-27%.

The growth investor would baulk at these numbers and rightly so. But this is the stock market, and the market is never kind to companies that don't grow, no matter how much free cash they threw off yearly. 

The market and media, laughingly, would only claim that such a company is too cheap when they attempt to go private. Otherwise by and large they are believers of efficient markets.

If you would believe that the company could earn about 120m and ascribe a multiple of 10, that would mean the company is worth 1400m, an upside of about 100%! Valuation is very personal.

Given what happen to my portfolio in 2022, I think it is fine to be too conservative. 

As of writing, I do not have any positions in Best World.

A short note to perhaps end the year

Sorry for the lack of updates. I have been distracted by pool of late. My mum's colonoscopy is this Wed, and she has signs of anemia, so...