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Saturday, December 25, 2021

Value Investing: In my own words

The following is an extract of an interview which I prepared for. Hence, the divider might not seem to make sense. Bear with me.

The following is an extract of an interview which I prepared for. Hence, the divider might not seem to make sense. Bear with me.


What is “value investing” in your own words? 
Loosely speaking, there are two general fields of value investing. The contemporary side is to look at growing business at a reasonable price. These can be business of any size, as long as they demonstrate real growth. Mathematically, real growth is not just an increase in revenue but also an increase in cashflows. A true synergy should result not just in bottom line improvements, but also profit margins.

 

So this is what Graham call investing by projection. The pro of this approach is that time is usually a friend. As the business compounds its value over time, even if you have been a little off with your valuation. This is the more well known version of value investing today.  
 
But I think this approach is harder because you have to think about moat, disruption, etc. You also have to assume certain numbers about the growth and discount rates. If you ask a fellow investor of the same company, what the price is worth, it can differ a great deal. You can easily overpay for quality. Just look at Alibaba at the moment. 
 
So you usually hold on to these companies as the value compounds. If you pick the right company, sometimes you don’t ever sell them. That is the best thing about GARP-- you buy one decent company and time compound its value wonderfully. Not 100-baggers were a result of a year or two of brilliance.  

 

The other side of the fence is investing by protection. So you look at the business from liquidation value. You look at its assets, you look at its liabilities. Usually the business quality is average because the market is not that stupid. So there might be problems with the company, but there should not be an issue with it as a going concern*. Investing in cheap companies is where I am comfortable in. 

 

GARP is usually a qualitative bet while investing in cheap companies (“by protection”)is usually a quantitative exercise. It is far easier to tell that a company is cheap than if it is good. 

 

With buying cheap companies, you are more likely to sell when the value-price mismatch has narrowed. I prefer to invest by protection. When the price goes down meaningfully, 15% or more, I feel extremely comfortable to invest even more money… The odds are better when the price is going down. I am not an institutional investor so I can wait for a long time for value to revert. I don’t have anyone to answer to. So I could buy the more reprehensible company imaginable. But there is a lot more churn (buying and selling) than GARP.

 

I think value investing has been unfairly bashed and, the process, over simplified. 

Value investing is more nuanced than just looking at price to books and PE ratios

 

I pay attention to news about companies or sectors with problems because I have a healthy respect for EMH (efficient market hypothesis)—again I think discounts only comes with uncertainty and problems. But the management should not be the source of the problem.  

When a company becomes that cheap, as Walter Schloss says, many good things can happen. He called it 3 strings to a bow: first… the company could buy back shares; secondly, if the company is that cheap, it can be bought over; and lastly, the problems could be resolved over time and value can revert. 
 
So the perfect opportunity is when a GARP becomes cheap statistically and it is under a problem through no fault of its own (stock market crash, sector issue). I tend to look at company valuation by enterprise value (market cap + debt minus cash) divided by average earnings, not EBIT or worse EBITDA. I am very conservative. 

 

The typical value investor portfolio usually consist of a mix of these along with special situations as a form of protection. Special situations include arbitrages, spin-offs, and restructuring. These special situation stocks depend far more on corporate action and less on market sentiments… they can be a drag during bull markets but are wonderful buoys during bears. On a long-term basis, participating in only special situation stocks would be satisfactory. 

I have a healthy respect for the efficient market hypothesis. Most stocks are fairly priced, or should I say overpriced given how conservative I am, most of the time. The only time where price falls far from value is when there is uncertainty.  
 
The scope of this uncertainty/problem could range from globally or regionally, or an entire sector, or just the company alone. I find that in the same order, the frequency of this kind of opportunity goes from high to low, and the potential returns are from fair to high. 
 
 

Scope of Uncertainty 

Frequency/Incidence 

Potential Returns 

Global/Regional 

Low 

Fair 

Sector 

Medium 

Medium 

Company 

High 

High 

   

Always look at what the insiders are doing. 

 

I think the key to doing fine in investing is to understand the limits of your ability. The stock market is like stepping into an exam hall that provides you thousands of exam questions, and those with the highest marks are not necessary the ones with the hardest question.  
 
I am a simpleton, so I spend time looking for easy problems. I find my patience tested constantly, both by waiting for the simple problem, and also by the value reversion. Quite often I find myself losing discipline. So I understood what Buffett meant in the introduction of the revised edition of "The Intelligent Investor"


"To invest successfully over a lifetime does not require a stratospheric IQ, unusual business insights, or inside information. What's needed is a sound intellectual framework for making decisions and the ability to keep emotions from corroding that framework This book precisely and clearly prescribes the proper framework. You must supply the emotional discipline."


What most value investors would neglect to tell you, is the emotional worry between buying and that very moment where the seed sprouts (if it happens). The state of the mind frequently swings between stubbornness and self doubt.


That, is value investing in my own words.

Sunday, December 12, 2021

2021 Year End Review (numbers review, projections, bagholders and indexing)

//I am posting this up ahead of time due to family reasons.

//as of 17-Dec, 11pm Singapore Time, I have sold out of Futu Holdings.

2021 has been an incredible year due to 1 and only 1 stock: Perfect Shape Medical. Returns has been monetarily rewarding but intellectually lacking. I am not proud of the idea as much as perhaps Xinghua Port. Realized P&L from Perfect Shape represented 80% of total returns. 

Here are the numbers, screen captured from Stock.cafe. The portfolio currently has a time weighted returns of more than 10% over SPY, and hopefully should remain this way at the end of the year.



Overall XIRR is 29.89% but largely skewed because of the last two years of returns. The market has been very kind to me.

Interestingly, my portfolio has been far more volatile than SPY, but less so that the Hong Kong Tracker Fund. Volatility is not an important measure for value investors.

Max Drawdown is also higher compared to SPY this year, but it was nothing compared to what Hong Kong investors suffered. On the bright side, I think if you could endure draw downs like this, you could endure almost anything.

Dividends returns % in total returns

Dividend returns is only 8% of my total returns this year.

This is significantly lower (~30%) than last year's returns because of the complete divestment of Perfect Shape /Medical. Perfect Shape Medical is currently yielding 0.427 cents of its 5.94 HKD price. The median price of my holdings back then was about 2.5 HKD, which means it is 15-17% yield had I held on. But could I stomach the loss of 50% opportunity to sell had I held on? 

The answer is a strong no. The management seems to cheerlead its stock far too much, and the other reason for selling the stock is potential di-worse-ification-- it could be spreading its resources far too thin across too many fields. I don't regret selling Perfect Shape one bit.

That doesn't mean that the management is wrong-- perhaps they could pull it off and this article would not age well.

My investment strategy is mainly towards capital gains. Dividend is just salary for the waiting.

Looking Forward to 2022

This is the section which is going to get me into trouble.

In terms of expected returns, I would repeat what I said in 2020's year end review: I pretty much doubt I could do better than what I had in 2021. 2020 was a great year, 2021 was incredible. I would be very happy to beat the index by a meaningful margin, and that is all I wish for.

Some bold hopes and projection for 2022:

OKP

I hope that OKP would value revert soon. The company is back to winning contracts and hopefully earnings will return to pre-accident levels. There are a few ways this can happen, besides increase profitability:

a) Increased share buy back

b) Going private: I would be happy with a 40% premium, although that is actually a good deal for whoever is buying over OKP at this price. Given the Or's majority stake, they are the only possibility of this happening.

c) Acquisition of a more "interesting" business (unlikely)

d) Special dividend (also unlikely)

At this moment, I am looking at my portfolio and thinking about my position sizing. It is unlikely I would increase shareholding in OKP. In the event that a market crash of 30% and upwards, I would likely to purchase local bank stocks and index funds as I am generally out of ideas at the moment. 

China Property Sector

I am not optimistic of the Chinese property market as a whole. There will be casualties. This is a classic case of leverage gone wrong. Yes, one could make a case that the Chinese government is responsible for issuing the 3 red lines policy, hence introducing turbulence in this sector. I would argue that leverage has been adopted too freely, and the G was right to bring this to heel. 

My bets on the Chinese property sector is marked by sizeable and meaningful investments (17% of total portfolio) in Central China Real Estate and Central China Management. The latter is very cheap on cashflow: but if the market does suffer a meltdown, the biggest casualty would not just be the highly-leveraged, but the banks. I would expect the G to inject capital, and perhaps nationalize the debt in some manner. 

Perhaps they could force the companies into some kind of convertible debt issue (i.e. the ones some auto had made with the US Govt in 2008-9), or replace the managements. But as of now, I still believe that in the worst case scenario, CCRE is one of the better ones around, and CCMGT is probably more than priced in, in the event of a meltdown. Both have been backed by adequate insider buying, which is comforting to me. These two companies represent the best chance I got when recovery takes place.

Alibaba

I am going to offend a lot of people in this section.

Returns are likely to be lackluster at best. I do not expect permanent loss of capital. As it stands, I am about 14% down. The market is very generous to growth; and punishing when it doesn't. I think Alibaba as of now is fairly priced, but moderate growth should bring about market-equaling returns. There is a strong possibility of the Ant Group IPO, but that is in the mercy of the markets. Surely during a bear year, no one would be in the right mind to IPO? Would they be so kind of distribute Ant Group in the form of a special situation, such as a spin-off? Unlikely. 

So I am going to put my head out there and value it using my layman understanding:

The e-commerce business, in the latest interim, contributes about 12B USD. The cloud computing and entertainment branch, as well as its "innovation" branch are still loss-making. 

They could possibly spin off the cloud computing branch. The cloud computing segment contributes about 5.6B in revenue for the last six months (or 12B USD annualized). It appears to grow 30%, so let say if we give it a 5x-10x Price to Sales ratio value, that is 60B-120B.

33% of Ant Group belongs to Alibaba. If it had gone through its 35B USD IPO then, Alibaba stake would be worth ~11B USD (~452B HKD). Its latest interim earnings was 1.7B USD

To guess-timate very, very conservatively,

Alibaba current market cap is 339B USD

-E-commerce, if it contribute 24B in annualized earnings, on a P/E of 10-15= 240B-360B

(There were whispers that at current valuation, one is only paying for the e-commerce business and everything else is free. That is only the case if e-commerce is valued highly. I am not sure, going forward, if there is sufficient margin of safety)

-Cloud Computing= 60B to 120B, average it and give it a 90B.

-Ant Group IPO= at 1.7B USD interim, is worth about 3B USD x 15 PE= about 45B. If Ali owns 1/3 of it, that is about 15B.

Sum it up, Alibaba is worth between 315B - 465B.

So very conservatively, we are looking at about fair value for Alibaba. I shall discount the other business segment from Alibaba as they are generally loss-making and prospects are dim. 

What can change the narrative? I believe there has to be a reasonably large growth in the e-commerce sector (which is facing competition), a very blissful valuation for Ant's IPO (more likely since the G has a share in it), and AliCloud...well I have no idea how much AliCloud is worth.

Centurion and TTJ (combined weightage of 17.4% as of writing)

I do not expect anything from these. TTJ could possibly raise dividends if business improves, but not much. Centurion has too much debt but would stand to prosper if COVID is a thing of the past. 

The Rubbish: Pershing Square Tontine Holdings, Futu Holdings, and Didi Global

These stocks are call the rubbish because they are generally so badly hated by existing shareholders. Rightfully so, all of them probably saw losses of 50% and more.

PSTH has little to no down side and I am holding on to it using LEAPs. Every other day, I would log in to Reddit r\psth and look at the despair. I am more optimistic than the typical tontard (term used to self-deprecating Tontine + Retard, I suppose?)

Futu Holdings: I believe that unless regulatory backlash is overly shocking (which will result in cash outflows), Futu is currently fairly priced based on very conservative growth projections. This is a high risk, high reward play, and the G could take its time. Betting with options is risky, and the last time I check, they are costly due to its implied volatility. I am holding a small amount of stock and have written put options. Even if the puts do get converted, it does not represent a huge sum of money on my portfolio.

Sold out of Futu. I think valuation would be severely affected (by possible regulation by China authorities) and hence I am sold out.

Didi Global: I have no idea when the G will decide, and how it will be delisted. As such, a small amount of money is riding on the outcome. As mentioned the previous post, I am holding the stock after the option buyer exercised the put option. I am still holding the stock today. I think it is a bit risky to buy options for this. I do not expect a windfall, probably a modest gain at most. The possibility of a loss is still prevalent as I had mention in my previous post.

Unrealized losses: Which stocks am I bagholding?

In terms of percentages, 3 of my holdings contribute to the most amount of unrealized capital losses are:
-Alibaba Group (-14%)
-Carpenter Tan (-13.2%)
-Fu Shou Yuan (-11.54%)

In terms of absolute unrealized loss, in descending order,
-Carpenter Tan
-Alibaba Group
-Central China Real Estate Limited (CCRE)

Alibaba and Fu Shou Yuan are my only growth at an reasonable price (GARP) stocks. Ironically they are beaten down the most. I have no idea why FSY is down (although 11.5% isn't a big deal). I have already said my piece about Alibaba above.

Carpenter Tan is proof that the market is based on growth and nothing but growth. The top line of this little company has experience little to no growth over the years, but it yields an astonishing returns on invested capital. I think Carpenter Tan would have been valued more kindly if it was privately held.


Net income margin is 28, 33 and 36% for the last three years. The company has not been in red since IPO. 


Free cash flow ranged from worst, 60m to best, 120m. The average is about 96m.

The company is selling at only 892m HKD as a whole in the market. Dividends is on the generous side, and even this year (which is definitely its poorest year) is yield just under 5%. The company bears no debt. Cash position is 78m RMB (~95m HKD), 253m RMB (~309m HKD) in financial assets (mainly in low risk, principal guaranteed financial products). That is almost 400m HKD in liquid assets.

You are paying only 500m HKD for a business that pays you 96m of free cash flow every year. That is a cash yield of almost 20%!? The business would have paid for itself in 4 years.

So the market is betting that the fortunes of this company would only go downhill from here.



Investing in Carpenter Tan as a stock market participant has not been fruitful. Capital loss is evenly covered by dividend returns. The stock market is a funny place. But I do wish Carpenter Tan had not been so generous in its dividend earlier on, else the value would had been very evident today.

Carpenter Tan has a weightage of 10% on my portfolio.

Should I have Index?

I started my investing journey at the rip old age of 36. That is a tremendous disadvantage, since I have lost 10 years of precious compounding. Back then my meagre salary would mean that I could only invest perhaps 600$ SGD every month. If had start passive indexing, assuming a 5% CAGR, back then, would I have done far better than my efforts in the last 5-6 years?

It turns out that I done pretty well investing actively... I would have to index 23 years to get returns like this. But friends have remarked that I aged pretty much these years too. So, I would have to be 26+23 = 49 years old to get returns like this from passive indexing if I started at 26 years old. I saved 8 years of life at least.

I still believe that indexing is the way to go. Firstly... the returns is actually better than 5% long term (I am very conservative). Secondly, indexing consumes less of your time, allowing you to focus on your other cash flows-- your career (salary), or business.

I earn way lesser than the median salary, so I have virtually no choice. You wouldn't be able to tell from reading this, but I am just feeling so grateful now, looking back at my results, that I wasn't punish for starting investing so late in my life.

That is all. Hopefully the rest of the year and next would be kind to us. I am only hoping that my parents be well.

Sunday, December 5, 2021

December 2021 Update

As usual, returns first:

SPDR Singapore Straits Times Index Fund (ES3): 17.18% (8-Nov) ->  11.78% (6-Dec)
Comment: I have no idea that the STI went down so much.

Hong Kong Tracker Fund (2800): -5.02% -> -7.64%

SPDR S&P 500 ETF (SPY): 29.19% -> 27.05%
This is a much more modest retracement than it felt from reading the news.

My portfolio returns: 37.70% -> 44.09%.
The increase is attributed to Central China Management prices going way back up.
It went as low as 1.04  last month to 1.67 today. Average price is about 1.4. It is now, on value, my 2nd biggest position alone, without considering CCRE into the picture.

Notable Transactions:
1) Purchase of Didi as the put options I wrote expired well in the money. 
The strike price was 7 and it was set to expire last Friday. It was dumb: I was trying to close the position on Thursday and the bid was only a few cents apart. We all knew what happen on Friday: The SEC did Chinese firm investors no favors with the rule change. The stock went down 22% and the put options went up by 1400%.

Since the IPO price is $14, I suspect there are a few possible outcomes:
a) Delisting at a small discount to $14, followed by a re-listing in HKEX.
This is actually the outcome most bullish investors are hoping for. 

a2) Seamless transition to HKEX/China market without much delay
Without a reasonably long pent up period of uncertainty, the sell down will be less severe than (b).

b) Conversion of shares to HKEX.
This is the least favorable outcome. Most investors (if they have not already) would realize the loss for tax reasons. Investors are likely to sell when they list in HKEX due to uncertainty. If Didi decides to go for this route, the time to buy is after they were re-list.

c) Nothing happens
And CCP friendly officials get elected to the board. This is also unfavorable.

2) Initial investment into Futu Holdings, and wrote a contract of only 1 put option for it expiring Dec 31, strike price 40. I expect the probability of this contract to be exercise to be very, very high.

The plan is to invest more when the price drops from 40-> 30.

3) Increase in Alibaba Group due to lower prices. At the moment of writing, Baba in NYSE lost almost 10% last Friday, and this should carry over to Monday's trading in Hong Kong. I am expected to buy more.

They always say: don't catch a falling knife. My left hand brain tells me to use simple TA to find a bottom (none as of now). But the market turns all the time. If one is to wait for clarity, it is often too late... by the time things are clear, the price would already have moved.

At what price would Alibaba be really a steal? I think it is somewhere around the 80 HKD mark. But I am way more conservative than others... and I don't think others would wait.

Notice the language here? I am thinking about how others would behave: This is already trading.

Having said that, while prices are not great at the moment, it should do OK over time. 5 year horizon.

4) Modest increase in CCRE (832) due to lowering prices

Notes:
I have did an interview with Boon Tee last week and the video was released on Saturday.


The main message was being conservative on investing, hence there were no specifics discussed about my portfolio construction, etc. I think it is great since I write better than I talk (Boon Tee did a great job to convert my mumbling into sensible pieces), and it is quite a dry and technical subject.

I will try to write a year-end review in a few weeks time. 

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