Objective
This post attempts to fulfill two objectives. First, it seeks to demonstrate that the value in TTJ ("company"), even when conservatively considered, is leaps and bounds higher than the conditional cash offer. The exercise does not involve by plainly looking at the Net Asset Value stated in their books, but a practical and simple way of assessing things.
The second, is how I felt about the whole situation, what one should realistically expect as a shareholder, and what I had learnt from this episode.
Back of the envelope valuation of TTJ
As we go along, keep in mind, the offer from THC Ventures is 0.23$ a share, or a total consideration (for 349.5m shares), 80.385m.
The value of TTJ are primary in 3 areas, liquid assets, properties, and the structural steel business.
Liquid Assets
|
Stated
value (31-Jan-2022) |
After
Discount (Discount %) |
Cash and
equivalent |
29.152 |
29.152m |
Trade and
Receivables |
24.2m |
20.6m
(15%) |
Contract
Assets |
34.7m |
27.7m
(20%) |
The first step is to consider the more liquid assets of the company, namely cash, receivables and contract assets. Then, we proceed to apply a discount to each asset according. In case of cash, there is zero need to discount it-- after all, cash is cash. As for receivables ($ owe to the company by customers), 15% is applied in case of counterparty risk. (Do take note: no discount is applied to any liabilities, include account payables.)
Since there is a fair amount of judgement needed, a 20% discount to the value stated is reasonable.
The sum of these assets, discounted, is 77.452m
Properties
TTJ has property (both leasehold and freehold), that are either in the books, or disposed. For asset not sold, the acquisition cost price of the asset would be used. After all, if the price is not reasonable, why did management purchase it?
We will omit the property at 57 Pioneer Road as there is only 2 years left on lease, although I recognize that there is definitely value in it, and hence left out in this exercise.
1) Disposed factory at Johor Bahru
valued at 13.377m SGD
2) Factory in Chachoengsao District, the Kingdom of Thailand
for the purpose of wood pellet business which is suspended.
Acquired at cost: 5.95m
Source: http://www.ttj.com.sg/newsroom/yr2018/TTJ_Proposed_Acquisition_of_Assets_in_Thailand.pdf
3) Factory in 51 Shipyard Crescent
for the purpose of wood pellet business which is suspended.
Acquired at cost: 16.81m
Source: http://www.ttj.com.sg/newsroom/yr2018/TTJ_Proposed_Acquisition_BFI_announcement.pdf
Due to the cyclical nature of the business, it is more prudent to look at long term earnings of the company. Figures below are extracted from annual reports of each year, usually classified under Note 4 "Financial Information by Operating Segments."
Profit
Before Tax for Structural Steel business
2009 15.891m
2010 6.244m
2011 12.818m
2012 14.042m
2013 9.297m
2014 14.630m
2015 5.152m
2016 19.562m
2017 9.894m
2018 9.898
2019 5.022m
2020 -3.526m
2021 10.952m
Average:
9.99m
Median: 9.89m
Applying a
tax rate of 17%, it is 8.217m, and applying a conservative multiple of 7 times,
the structural steel business is worth about 56m. Even at the worst year
earnings of 5.022m (post tax: 4.17m), it is worth about 28m.
Take note that Mr Teo has always run his business prudently, outlasting many of its peers. It has an order book of 187m, which are projects that will run between this year till 2024.
Summary
|
Stated
value (31-Jan-2022) |
After
Discount (Discount %) |
Cash and
equivalent |
29.152 |
29.152m |
Trade and
Receivables |
24.2m |
20.6m
(15%) |
Contract
Assets |
34.7m |
27.7m
(20%) |
|
|
|
Sales/Disposal/Acquisition
of factories/offices |
|
|
JB
factory |
13.37m (disposed) |
13.37m |
Thailand
factory |
5.95m (at cost) |
5.95m |
Singapore
(51 Shipyard Cresc) |
16.81m (at cost) |
16.81m |
|
|
|
Total
Assets |
|
113.582m |
Total
liabilities |
26.695m |
26.695m (no discount) |
Value of TTJ (without accounting for structural steel business; and 57
Pioneer Road leasehold property) |
|
86.887m or $0.248 per share |
Estimation
of Structural Steel Business |
|
a) Based
on worst year earnings: 28m |
Value of
TTJ with Structural Steel Business |
|
a) Based
on worst year earnings: b) Based on median year earnings: 142.515m,
or $0.409 a share |
Stated
Net Asset Value (from half yearly result, announced Mar 2022) |
|
128.582m,
or $0.3679 a share |
Voluntary
Conditional Cash Offer |
|
80.385m,
or $0.23 a share |
My Opinion
A reasonable assessment of the company's value, even without considering the structural steel business, is at least modestly more than the offer.
Mr Teo has been widely thought of as shareholder friendly, honest and forth-coming. This move to buy out, using a company to circumvent takeover codes, is very surprising and disappointing.
Surely he wouldn't want his company, in the many years to come, to be quoted as the reason why a certain Singapore Exchange rule was birthed, out of the need to patch a certain loophole? Reputation is priceless.
I would be very fair and say that as minority shareholders, it is not reasonable to expect 40 over cents (that is the value, in my head, for optimal price + premium for control. Your value might differ.). Firstly, Mr Teo could have carried on status quo for as long as he likes. Secondly, he assumed the risk and effort in building up the company. Sure, as a listed company, there is a a minimum amount of public shareholders required, and credit is easier to access as a listed entity.
Meeting at middle ground is a far more balanced and fair approach to both shareholders and management, leaving both parties feeling that nothing is lost or taken away. I note that in the offer document, under note 2(e), that the offer is not fixed. So I am hopeful.
Lastly, as a note to myself, this episode reminded me that cigar butt investing is fraught with danger. Cheap companies (even with asset value modestly discounted), with low returns on equity, required countless injection of capital over the years, as the price keep falling.
When one pursues this approach, he or she will feel immense unease-- that prices will remain depressed for years, or worse, got acquired with an offer as unsatisfactory as this. I have success with this approach in the past, but this is not one of them. However, it is a very good lesson.
-as of writing, TTJ weighs 9.81% of the entire portfolio. I have been a shareholder since 2017.